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It is assumed that in an n-firm single-product oligopoly without product differentiation
the firms face an uncertain price function, which is considered random by the firms. At
each time period each firm simultaneously maximizes its expected profit and minimizes
the variance of the profit since it wants to receive as high as possible profit with the least
possible uncertainty. It is assumed that the best response of each firm is obtained by
the weighting method. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium, and investigate
the local stability of the equilibrium.
RESUMEN
Es asumido que en un oligopolio de n-firmas “single-product” sin diferenciacio´n pro-
ducto firmas con funcio´n de precio variable, son consideradas randon por las firmas.
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En todo per´ıodo de tiempo todo firma simultaneamente maximiza la utilidad esperada
y minimiza la variacio´n de utilidad desde que estan quisen obtener la utilidad mas alta
posible con la menor incertidumbre posible. Es asumido que la mejor respuesta de toda
firma es obtenida por el metodo weighting. Mostramos la existencia de un equilibrio
u´nico y investigamos la estabilidad local del equilibrio.
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1 Introduction
The uncertainty in the inverse demand functions of oligopoly models has been previously examined
by many researches. Cyert and DeGroot (1971, 1973) investigated mainly duopolies. Kirman (1975,
1983) examined the case of differentiated products and linear demand functions and analysed how
the resulting equilibria depend on the way the firms misspecify and try to assess the demand
function. Gates et al. (1982) also examined linear demand functions and differentiated products.
Leonard and Nishimura (1999) assumed that the firms know the shape of the demand function but
misspecify its scale, and investigated the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium under discrete
time scales. Chiarella and Szidarovszky (2001) have introduced the continuous counterpart of
the Leonard-Nishimura model and in addition to equilibrium and local stability analysis, the
destabilising effect of time delays, in obtaining and implementing information on the competitors’
output, was analysed. Bischi et al. (2004) consider the situation in which the firms’ reaction
functions are unimodal and analyse the various equilibria that may arise and their complicated
basins of attraction. All these earlier studies assumed that the firms maximized their misspecified
or expected payoffs at each time period depending on the type (deterministic or stochastic) of the
model being used.
In this paper we introduce a new approach. The uncertainty of the inverse demand function
is treated here also with a stochastic model, but we assume that at each time period each firm
maximize its expected profit and at the same time tends to reduce profit uncertainty by minimizing
its variance. That is, at each time period the firms face a “Pareto-game”, each with multiple payoffs
(see for example Szidarovszky et al., 1986). In our model, in each time period each firm uses a
multiobjective optimization approach to find its best response. Based on these best response
functions a dynamic process develops. The subject of this paper is the properties of this dynamic
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2 The Mathematical Model and Equilibrium Analysis
Consider an n-firm single-product oligopoly without product differentiation. Let qj be the output
of firm j, and Cj(qj) the associated cost function. Assume that firm j believes that the true price
function is f(Q) + ηj , where Q =
∑n
j=1 qj is the total output of the industry and ηj is a random
variable such that
E(ηj) = 0 and V ar(ηj) = σ
2
j . (2.1)
Using pij to denote profit, the expected profit of firm j is given as
E(pij) = qjf(Q)− Cj(qj), (2.2)
and the variance of profit is





Assume that firm j wants to maximize its expected profit and at the same time to minimize the
variance of the profit. That is, the firm tends to obtain as high a profit as possible with minimum
uncertainty. It is also assumed that firm j uses the weighting method (see for example, Szidarovszky









where αj shows the relative importance of reducing uncertainty compared to the increase of the
expected profit.
In oligopoly theory it is usually assumed that the functions f and Cj (j = 1, 2, · · · , n) are








(Q)− C′′j (qj) < 0,
for all j and nonnegative qj and Q.
Under conditions (a) and (b) the composite objective function (2.4) is strictly concave in qj
with fixed value of Qj =
∑
l 6=j ql. The derivative of the objective function (2.4) with respect to qj
can be given as
qjf
′




′ ≤ 0, C′ ≥ 0, f(Q) ≤ f(0), therefore with positive αj and σj , this derivative
converges to −∞ as qj → ∞ implying that there is a unique maximizing value, qj ≥ 0, with any
fixed Qj ≥ 0. The best response of firm j, Rj(Qj), can be obtained in the following way. If
f(Qj)− C
′
j(0) ≤ 0, (2.5)
then Rj(Qj) = 0, otherwise it is the unique positive solution of the equation
qjf
′




j = 0. (2.6)
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Since f is decreasing, from condition (2.5) we see that if Rj(Qj) = 0 then for all Q¯j > Qj ,
Rj(Q¯j) = 0. Assume next that Rj(Qj) > 0. Then equation (2.6) is satisfied with qj = Rj(Qj).


































Conditions (a) and (b) imply that
−1 < R′j ≤ 0. (2.8)
Therefore Rj is a decreasing function of Qj. We can rewrite equation (2.6) as
qjf
′





The left hand side strictly decreases in qj , therefore the solution qj = Rj(Qj) decreases if αj
and/or σj increases.
We can also consider qj as a function of the total output level of the industry, qj = qj(Q),
which can be defined as follows. If
f(Q)− C′j(0) ≤ 0, (2.10)
then qj(Q) = 0, otherwise it is the unique positive solution of the equation
qjf
′
(Q) + f(Q)− C′j(qj)− αjqjσ
2
j = 0. (2.11)
With fixed values of Q, the left hand side is strictly decreasing in qj , it has a positive value
at qj = 0 and converges to −∞ as qj →∞. Similarly to the previous case, condition (2.5) implies
































so qj(Q) is decreasing in Q. We can rewrite equation (2.11) as
qjf
′
(Q) + f(Q)− C′j(qj) = αjqjσ
2
j . (2.13)
The left hand side is decreasing in qj , therefore the solution qj(Q) decreases if αj and/or σj
increases.
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qj(Q)−Q = 0. (2.14)









it follows that the left hand side converges to −∞ as Q→∞, furthermore it is strictly decreasing
in Q. Consequently there is a unique nonnegative solution of equation (2.14) proving the existence
and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In summary, we have the following result.
Theorem 1 Under conditions (a) and (b) there is a unique equilibrium of the modified n-
person oligopoly with payoff functions (2.4).
The unique equilibrium of theorem 1 is usually different from the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of the n-firm oligopoly under the assumption that all firms know the true price function
f . Let Q
∗
(α, σ) denote the total industry output at the equilibrium with given parameters
α = (α1, · · · , αn) and σ = (σ1, · · · , σn). We will prove the following result:
Theorem 2 The value of Q∗(α, σ) decreases if any αj or σj increases.
Proof: Assume that αj < α¯j with all other αi and all σi values unchanged. Let qi and q¯i
denote the corresponding equilibrium outputs and let Q =
∑
i qi and Q¯ =
∑
i q¯i. Contrary to the
assertion assume that Q < Q¯. From the monotonicity of the functions qi(Q) we have for all i 6= j,
qi(Q) ≥ qi(Q¯) = q¯i(Q¯), (2.15)
since αi and σi do not change. However
qj(Q) ≥ q¯j(Q) ≥ q¯j(Q¯), (2.16)









q¯i(Q¯) = Q¯, (2.17)
which is an obvious contradiction.
The assertion of theorem 2 can be reformulated as follows: If any firm increases its weight αj
of uncertainty and, or assumes larger level σ
2
j of uncertainty of the price function, then the total
industry output decreases at the equilibrium.
3 Dynamic Models and Local Stability Analysis
We recall from the previous section that Rj(Qj) denotes the best response of firm j. In this section
we consider dynamic processes with the firms’ adjustment of output based on their best responses.
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Considering continuous time scales first and assuming that each firm adjusts its output in the
direction toward its best response, we obtain the system of ordinary differential equations
q˙j = Kj(Rj(Qj)− qj), (j = 1, 2, · · · , n), (3.1)





= 0, if ∆ = 0,
> 0, if ∆ > 0,
< 0, if ∆ < 0.
Theorem 3 The equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable under conditions (a) and (b) and
by assuming that K ′j(0) > 0 for all j.



























































j is the derivative of Rj at the equilibrium.
The Jacobian (3.2) may be represented as




K = diag(−K ′1(1 +R
′























The characteristic polynomial of JC is given by























Notice that relation (2.8) implies that 1+R′j > 0 for all j, so all roots of the first product are













are also real and negative. We might assume that the denominators are different, otherwise the
sum of terms with identical denominators can be represented as a single term where the numerators
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are added. Equation (3.5) is equivalent to a polynomial equation of degree n, so there are n real
or complex roots. Let g(λ) denote the left hand side, then clearly
lim
λ→±∞
























so g is strictly decreasing locally. The graph of the function g is shown in figure 1. There are n
negative poles at λ = −K ′j(1 +R
′
j) (j = 1, 2, · · · , n), there is a root between each pair of consecu-
tive poles and there is an additional root before the first pole. We have demonstrated that there






























Figure 1: Graph of the function g(λ)
Considering discrete time scales next, we assume again that the firms adjust their outputs
into the direction toward their best responses, and so the outputs adjust according to
qj(t+ 1) = qj(t) +Kj(Rj(Qj)− qj), (j = 1, 2, · · · , n), (3.6)
where Kj is a sign-preserving function for all j.
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Theorem 4 Assume that conditions (a) and (b) hold, furthermore K ′j(0) > 0 for all j. The
































If any of these conditions is violated with strict inequality, then the equilibrium is unstable.
Proof: The Jacobian of system (3.6) at the equilibrium can be written as
JD = I + JC , (3.9)
where I is the n× n identity matrix. All eigenvalues of JD are inside the unit circle if and only if
all eigenvalues of JC are inside the interval (−2, 0). From the proof of theorem 3 we know that all
eigenvalues of JC are negative, so the eigenvalues are larger than −2 if and only if
−K ′j(1 +R
′
j) > −2, (3.10)
for all j, and
g(−2) > −1. (3.11)
Notice that inequality (3.10) can be rewritten as (3.7), and inequality (3.11) can also be
rewritten as (3.8).
If either (3.10) or (3.11) is violated with strict inequality, then at least one eigenvalue of JC
becomes less than −2, so at least one eigenvalue of JD is below −1, demonstrating the instability
of the equilibrium in this case.
Notice that all denominators of inequality (3.7) are positive because of the relation (2.8).
Condition (3.7) implies that all denominators on the left hand side of (3.8) are also positive.
Therefore condition (3.8) can be interpreted as stating that all derivativesK ′j(0) must be sufficiently
small in order to guarantee the local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium.
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